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Abstract—One-time-pad (OTP) encryption simply cannot be cracked,
even by a quantum computer. The need of sharing in a secure way sup-
plies of symmetric random keys turned the method almost obsolete as a
standing-alone method for fast and large volume telecommunication. Basi-
cally, this secure sharing of keys and their renewal, once exhausted, had to
be done through couriers, in a slow and costly process. This paper presents
a solution for this problem providing a fast and unlimited renewal of secure
keys: An untappable key distribution system is presented and detailed. This
fast key distribution system utilizes two layers of confidentially protection:
1) Physical noise intrinsic to the optical channel that turn the coded signals
into stealth signals and 2) Privacy amplification using a bit pool of refreshed
entropy run after run, to eliminate any residual information. The result-
ing level of security is rigorously calculated and demonstrates that the level
of information an eavesdropper could obtain is completely negligible. The
random bit sequences, fast and securely distributed, can be used to encrypt
text, data or voice.
Index Terms—Random, physical processes, cryptography, privacy am-
plification.
I. INTRODUCTION
A key distribution system that uses the intrinsic light noise of
an optical carrier to forbid an attacker E (or Eve) to extract clean
signals from the transmitted ones was described in Refs. [1] and
[2]. The basic characteristics of that system is that the legitimate
users, A (or Alice) and B (or Bob), are not affected in the same
way as E by the channel’s noise. This asymmetry is caused
by a starting information shared by A and B but not by E –
it produces a measurement advantage for A and B over Eve:
Signals buried under noise for Eve and clear signals for A or B.
This work stresses basic theoretical and practical aspects of
that physical system (Section III) and enhances its security by
an explicit privacy amplification protocol (PA) (Sections VI and
VII). The security level due to these two protection layers, phys-
ical and computational, is calculated and discussed. The physi-
cal implementation will be presented in a following work.
The use of optical noise to secure encryption of signals in
telecommunication channels was analyzed in [3] (alpha-eta en-
cryption system). This system was tested in secure networks in
US, in land-air tests (Optix/NuCrypt), reached market applica-
tions (NuCrypt LCC) and produced independent developments
in Japan [4]. The system discussed here is akin to the alpha-eta
(or αη) system in the use of optical noise but is specific as a key
distribution system. Furthermore, it uses true random bit gen-
erators instead of linear feedback-shift-registers (LFSR) used in
the alpha-eta systems.
The resulting securely shared random sequences of bits can
be used for encryption in arbitrary communication channels. It
can be used for bit-to-bit encryption as a “one-time pad” system,
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with constantly renewed keys in a fast process.
The discussed system has a basic connection in principle with
Ref. [5], where cryptography using continuous variables with
coherent states was proposed: the use of the optical noise is
also at the core of that scheme. However, several important
differences exist between these systems. Among them, optical
quantum demolition measurements are not necessary, neither
quadrature measurements. Therefore, the system discussed in
this paper is widely different and, as such, no need for compar-
isons exist.
The key distribution system presented here (as in [1]) uses
light’s noise for protection by modulating each signal repre-
senting a random bit by another randomly chosen (secret) sig-
nal representing a physical basis. The superposition of “noise”
signals, “basis modulation” and “bit” signals frustrates any at-
tacker trying to obtain either the basis used or the transmitted
bit. A privacy amplification protocol (PA) operates in a bit-pool
constantly renewed in entropy that enhances the security of the
system. The overall security achieved is calculated giving the
users a guaranteed security level.
This system is designed such that its ultimate security should
depend only on the secure transmission of the bits and their safe
storage. In a sense, the system can be fully understood and
signals openly acessed by the adversary and yet full security for
A and B resides just on the keys (Kerckhoff’s principle).
One among the uncountable uses for this continuously re-
newable and fast one time process, is the protection of energy
infrastructures (generation, distribution and their control inter-
connected by smart-grids). It involves not only eventual private
interests but above all it should rest as a main government inter-
est - the development of a nation and the wealthy of the people
depend on these infrastructures.
This paper is roughly divided in two parts, one dealing with
the physical noise and other with privacy amplification aspects.
Although the subjects are different, they are intrinsically con-
nected by the architecture of the key distribution system and are
essential for a full understanding of this system.
II. PHASE MODULATION AND OPTICAL NOISE
One of the simplest ways to implement the physical part of
the scheme is using optical phase modulation of a laser beam.
This modulation is achieved by fastly modifying the refractive
index of an optical medium in the beam path before the trans-
mission channel (fiber optics or any continuous media).
Bits could be represented by a given phase, say φ1 = 0◦ for
bit 1 and bit 0 by phase φ0 = 180◦. A basis is represented
by an extra phase φb, within a manyfold of M possible values,
that is added to φ1 or φ0 producing a different resulting phase:
φb,j = φj +φb, (j = 1,0) and (b = 1,2,3 . . .M). Both bit and
basis are unknown to the adversary. Fig. 1 explain these ideas.
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Fig. 1
WHEEL OF PHASES REPRESENTING ENCRYPTION BASES FOR BITS. BITS 0
AND 1 ARE REPRESENTED AT EXTREMES OF A BASIS AND SEPARATED BY
pi. ENCRYPTION BASES ARE SEPARATED BY pi/M . A BIT SIGNAL
REPRESENTED BY AN AMPLITUDE AND PHASE HAS AN INTRINSIC PHASE
NOISE (GIVEN BY σ2φ = 2/〈n〉) THAT MAY COVER ADJACENT BASES AND
DO NOT ALLOWS AN ATTACKER TO IDENTIFY THE SIGNAL BEING SENT.
WHILE A STRONG AMPLITUDE SIGNAL ALLOWS EASY IDENTIFICATION OF
THE BASES AND BIT (E.G., SEE SIGNAL AT BASIS b= 2), A WEAK SIGNAL
DOES NOT ALLOW SUCH IDENTIFICATION (E.G., SEE SIGNAL AROUND
BASIS 7 OR 8). IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT A SIGNAL
REPRESENTING ONE BIT IS SENT JUST ONCE AND NEVER REPEATED.
It represents a uniformly spaced set of bases constituted of M
physical phase bases (M = 15 : b= 0,1,2, . . . ,14 in this exam-
ple, closest bases are separated by an angle of 12◦). Each basis
is represented as a single line made up of a solid line continued
by a dashed one (a given phase value and this same value +180◦
represents a single basis).
The fundamental characteristics of these bases is that bits are
represented in an alternate order in neighboring bases. For ex-
ample, if Alice wants to send a bit 1 she may pick one basis, say
b = 2 (without Eve’s knowledge). In this basis, bit 1 is repre-
sented along a solid line (φ2 = 24◦). If she had picked b= 3, bit
1 would have been placed at the phase φ= (12× 3 + 180)◦. In
any of these cases, the closest bits in neighboring bases would
have been opposite.
The distance from the center, along any basis lines in Fig. 1,
gives the amplitude of the light field that carries the bit signal
while phases are represented around a circle as indicated. The
uncertainty in the signal to be measured (e.g., by measuring
Stokes parameters) can be represented in Fig. 1 by a smeared
figure representing uncertainties in amplitude and phase (see red
features in figure).
A difference between a strong and a weak coherent signal is
that the phase uncertainty over the average signal level with n
photons (1/
√〈n〉) for the weak signal is larger.
The phase uncertainty can be calculated in a similar way as
done in the polarization uncertainty obtained in [1] (Eq. (2)):
Assume that a laser beam in a coherent state |Ψ0〉= |α〉 passes
through an optical modulator that produces a phase difference
φ between its two physical axis (say x and y) for an incoming
polarization state. One should recall that for a coherent state
|α|2 = 〈n〉 [13].
The optical modulator is a two-port device for an incoming
state. The modulator transforms the state |α〉 according to the
angular momentum rotation operator Jz for two states (or two
modes). These states are represented by photon annihilation
operators ax and by: Jz = (1/2)(a+x ax− b+y by) [7]. The trans-
formation produces
|Ψ(φ)〉 = e−iJzφ|Ψ0〉
= | α√
2
e−iφ/2〉x| α√
2
eiφ/2〉y . (1)
In |Ψ(φ)〉 a phase is established due to a phase difference be-
tween two orthogonal components x and y. From this result the
overlap of two states |Ψ(φ)〉 and |Ψ(φ′)〉 can be obtained:
〈Ψ(φ)|Ψ(φ′)〉= e−|α|2
[
1−cos(φ−φ′2 )
]
. (2)
This overlap is a measure of the “indistinguishability” degree
between the two states. For mesoscopic states |α|2 1 (but not
intense) and the exponential term gives a vanishing contribution
unless φ− φ′ is small. Considering ∆φ ≡ φ− φ′ 1 one has
the Gaussian distribution
〈Ψ(φ)|Ψ(φ′)〉 → e−|α|2(∆φ)2/2 . (3)
The probability for indistinguishability between φ and φ′ is
then given by
|〈Ψ(φ)|Ψ(φ′)〉|2→ e−|α|2(∆φ)2 ≡ e−(∆φ)2/(2σφ2) , (4)
where σφ =
√
2/〈n〉.
This shows that a strong signal (large 〈n〉) has a reduced
phase uncertainty. For example, the large amplitude signal rep-
resenting a bit 0 in basis b = 2 could be easily identifiable (see
Fig. 1) by either A, B or E because the phase uncertainty is small
and no confusion is possible with a neighboring bit. Differently,
if the phase uncertainty is such (weak signal) that the obtained
signal overlaps neighboring bases (see uncertainty around basis
b = 8 in Fig. 1), the information of which basis is being used
is not available. Consequently, the bit sent cannot be identified
without a large probability of error. This noisy channel can be
referred as the αη channel.
However, if the legitimate users know which basis was used,
there is no ambiguity in bit identification. For them, bit identi-
fication is just a question of identifying if the signal is around a
given phase value φ or at φ+ 180◦, not between closest bases
where identification is not allowed due to the phase noise.
If the basis information is not available to Eve, her measure-
ments will produce errors in the bases or bit estimation (for ex-
ample, signals around bases 7 and 8). In other words, as the
separation between closest bases is pi/M , the resolution needed
for bit or basis identification has to be better than this value.
However, the noise is tailored by the legitimate users to pro-
duce an uncertainty much larger than pi/M and the attacker has
no way to reduce this noise.
With a proper choice of a separation ∆φ between bases and
average number of photons 〈n〉, not only the separation can be
set ∆φ < σ(= 1/
√
2〈n〉) but also the probability of an error by
Eve, PEe can be set arbitrarily close to 1/2 (see Fig. 3 in [1] and
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discussions therein). The derivation of Pe using POVM (Pos-
itive Operator Valued Measurement) can be found in Ref. [1].
Appendix B discuss the effect of noise in the channel in an al-
ternate way, by means of Poincare´ measurements. This way, the
reader has different contexts for comparisons.
The different amount of information between E and the legit-
imate users produce the different results between E and B in a
transmitted sequence of bits. This is made possible by informa-
tion shared beforehand in each transmission round by A and B
in the form of a secret stream with the information of the bases
being used and about which E has no information.
We will also see that this process can be continued without
limitation, without any need for A and B to meet after the first
contact.
XOR encoding?– Some questions may be asked, such as
“why this bases encoding cannot be replaced by a simple XOR
of basis(=single bit) with the bit, especially in the model where
the eavesdropper gets a perfect copy of the transmitted state?”.
The level of signals used in this implementation is such that
the term “perfect copy” does not apply. Whereas classical sig-
nals may admit the concept of a perfect copy (apart from tech-
nical noises), any “copy” of a signal in the mesoscopic range
produces a distinct output due to the inherent noise in the chan-
nel. In other words, use of signals where the signal-to-noise
ration S/N is very high (=“classical” signals) produces undis-
tinguishable copies. Of course, an XOR of classical signals pro-
duces well-defined signals and the attacker’s task will be solely
cryptanalysis of perfectly defined signals - a purely mathemati-
cal task. On the other hand, when dealing with an intrinsically
noisy channel, the first task of the adversary task is to make
sense of the signals being transmitted. Moreover, when these
signals are distributed among different physical states, the ad-
versary task to obtain even the sequence of signals to a poste-
rior cryptanalysis is shown impossible. Access to the αη chan-
nel gives the adversary very little information on the signals.
The amount of information available for cryptanalysis in the two
cases is vastly different.
III. THE TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION SYSTEM
Alice has a physical random bit generator (PhRBG) that pro-
duces true random bits continuously. One of the basic questions
to be answered in this paper is: Given that A and B start sharing
a secret random sequence of length c0, what is secure length of
bits to be extracted in the successive rounds of this system after
c0 have been used?
The original transmission protocol described in [1] and [2]
indicate the need for a PA protocol to be applied at the transmit-
ter and receiver stations to eliminate any information that the
attacker could have obtained in these attempts but no specific
procedure was proposed. Furthermore, in the present paper, in-
stead of assuming some repetition of bases as done in [1], the
idea of a “bit pool” is used leading to a substantial improvement
on the overall security of the system. This will be explained
ahead.
Basically the idea is use to PA to reduce the amount of in-
formation accessed by E to a negligible amount while giving
A and B access to a refreshed bit sequence to be used. This
frustrates even a-posteriori attacks using known-plaintext by an
A’s sender station B’s receiver station
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Fig. 2
A SIMPLIFIED SKETCH OF THE SENDER AND RECEIVER STATIONS USED BY
THE LEGITIMATE USERS ALICE AND B. THE FIBER CHANNEL MAY BE A
SINGLE FIBER WITH A NOISELESS CHANNEL AND A NOISY CHANNEL. THE
NOISY CHANNEL IS USED TO DISTRIBUTE SECRET RANDOM BITS BETWEEN
ALICE AND BOB WHILE THE NOISELESS CHANNEL IS USED TO TRANSMIT
ENCRYPTED INFORMATION. THESE CHANNELS HAVE TO BE SPECTRALLY
SEPARATED TO AVOID SPILL-OVERS FROM THE INTENSE NOISELESS
CHANNEL TO THE NOISY CHANNEL. THE DISTRIBUTED SECRET BITS ARE
TREATED AND PRIVACY AMPLIFIED IN A BIT POOL IN ALICE’S AND BOB’S
STATIONS. THE DISTILLED SECURE SEQUENCE OF BITS, z, IS USED FOR
ENCRYPTION OF TEXT, IMAGE OR VOICE. SIGNALS ARE SENT JUST ONCE
AND NEVER REPEATED. ACTUALLY, SENDER AND RECEIVER SYSTEMS
MAY BE CONTAINED IN BOTH A AND B STATIONS TO SIMULTANEOUSLY
OFFER SENDER/RECEIVER CAPABILITIES.
adversary trying to recover past bit sequences based on the bit
sequences obtained from the plaintext used. Before explaining
the protocol within the bit-pool, a description will be given of
the physical system where the protocols will operate.
Fig. 2 sketches the main parts of the key distribution system.
A single optical fiber contains an optical noisy channel (αη)
and a noiseless channel, both fully accessible to Alice, Bob and
Eve. Signals from the laser (carrier) are modulated at station A
and demodulated at station B. A physical random bit generator
(PhRBG) [8] feeds a control station composed of a computer
and electronics to perform required functions such as digital to
analog (DtoA) conversion, analog to digital (AtoD), XOR, and
PA operations on a bit pool. A final stream z of secure bits is
extracted from the pool to encrypt bit-by-bit any desired data x
(“message”) (c = x⊕ z) to be sent from A to B or from B to
A by the public channel. The PhRBG continuously generates a
fast stream of random bits a that feeds the control station.
Briefly described, A and B secretely shared c0 = mn0 bits
to create n0 modulation bases to encode n0 fresh bits generated
by the PhRBG (to be discussed ahead). m is the number of
bits necessary to specify each basis. Eve has full access to both
channels, noisy and noiseless. The optical signals are created
4by phase modulation of a laser beam to create the information
signals transmitted by the optical fiber. Signals in the classi-
cal channel have a high signal to noise ratio (SNR), while the
noisy channel has a relatively small SNR. The noisy channel is
wavelength separated from the classical channel such that the
wavelength separation avoids overlap of the wings of the strong
signals in the classical channel with the weak signal carried by
the noisy channel. Fig. 3 (taken from [9]) exemplifies signal and
noise levels taken at some point in a fiber network that include
optical amplifiers. The mesoscopic signals used in the key dis-
tribution system being discussed are above the the QKD level
(single photon level), but well below an intense (=classical) sig-
nal. We define a classical signal as a signal that can be perfectly
copied or only subjected to technical noises, that could be elim-
inated by improved techniques.
Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM, dense or coarse)
Fig. 3
DIFFERENT SIGNAL AND NOISE LEVELS DUE TO DIFFERENT PROCESSES IN
A NETWORK. THE MINIMUM NOISE LEVEL IS THE OSA NOISE DUE TO THE
SPECTRUM ANALYZER BEING USED WHILE THE MAXIMUM SIGNAL IS DUE
TO AMPLIFIED SIGNAL THAT ALSO PRODUCES A RELATIVELY HIGH
AMPLIFIED SPONTANEOUS EMISSION SIGNAL (EDFA ASE) THAT ACTS AS
A NOISE FOR SOME COMMUNICATION CHANNELS. SIGNAL FROM AN
OPTICAL SUPERVISORY CHANNEL (OSC) IS ALSO SHOWN.
technology can be used to set distinct channels in the same sin-
gle fiber around 1553nm. WDM wavelengths are standardized
with 100GHz spacing in optical frequencies, with a reference
fixed at 1552.52nm (193.10 THz). DWDM can use 50 GHz
channel spacing or even 25GHz spacing for up to 160 channel
operation. For a small size network, where no optical ampli-
fier is needed and only an Optical Supervisory Channel is used,
the amount of noise is much less, simplifying the setting of the
wavelengths to avoid cross-talk with the noisy channel carrying
the bits for the key distribution protocols.
The communication protocol is presented in the next section
and the operations performed by the control station will be dis-
cussed ahead. It is assumed that bits can be send in runs of size
n(i), where i is the run index. It is important to realize that the
separate sender and receiver station capabilities shown in Fig. 2
and Fig. 4-(a) could also be set in a same station, where both A
or B have emission and receiver capabilities Fig. 4-(b). In this
case, there is no change in the logical procedures used, all ar-
A PhRBG 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
A PhRBG 
B 
A  PhRBG 
B PhRBG 
1 
N 
2 
3 
N-1 
a b 
c PhRBG 
Fig. 4
SOME NETWORKING POSSIBILITIES FOR THE KEY DISTRIBUTION
PLATFORM. A) IS A CONFIGURATION WHERE ONLY A POSSESS A PHRBG
WHEREAS IN B) BOTH A AND B HAVE EQUAL CAPABILITIES. IN C),
SEVERAL RECEIVING STATIONS CAN BE SET FOR A SINGLE KEY-SENDER.
guments and explanations remain valid. Networking with more
stations is also possible; see Fig. 4-(c).
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Fig. 5
KEYBITS MODULAR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PLATFORM. SEE FIG. 2
FOR MORE DETAILS.
In Fig. 2 a dashed line indicates an “air-gap” that separates
a region (bottom part) assumed free of undesired interferences
of any kind, including reception or emission of electromagnetic
and acoustical signals. All information going to the secluded
region by the air-gap has to be monitored so that only electronic
signals with a fixed format and authentication are allowed. This
monitoring may happen through a FPGA (Field-Programmable
Gate Array) and memory accessed by one of the two computers,
in exclusive operations, through an automatized USB (Universal
Serial Bus)-switch. When operated with the computer in the
air-gap, the FPGA tag the files using the authentication-hash
adopted before sending them to the other computer.
In fact, separated emitter and reception stations in Fig. 2 may
be together in both stations A and B, so that each one is au-
tonomous, in a modular unit. Fig. 5 shows a modulus of this
platform, without the modulation and demodulation units.
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IV. THE PHYSICAL PROTOCOL
As shown in [1] and [2], and further discussed in Section III,
the noise in the channel combined with the use of closely sep-
arated bases reduce enormously the probability of success of
Eve. The signals she obtains do not allow her to obtain reliable
bit sequences to be analyzed. This is the physical protection
level in the key distribution scheme. However, this is not the
only level of difficult existing in the system.
A first round of sending bits will be described to establish the
basic ideas. A PhRBG continuously generates random bits a
that can be processed in a bit pool with operations fastly pro-
cessed by a FPGA or ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated
Circuit).
Initially, this bit pool starts with the shared c0 random bits,
constituted of c0 =mn0 bits to create n modulation bases. For
the sender, the total number of bits in the beginning of the pro-
cess is then n0 +n0m. It should be emphasized that despite the
need ofm bits to create a basis for modulate one bit, the process
has been demonstrated to be very fast in hardware.
The choice of m depends on the physical choice of the bases
to be used and the intensity of light, or average photon number
〈n〉 in the noisy optical channel (see [1] for explanations). For
example, if optical phase values are used in a circle of 2pi val-
ues, a choice of M values implies a distance of pi/M between
bases. A bit 1 could be represented by a phase value φ1 = pi
while a bit 0 is given φ0 = 0 in one given basis nM . In the other
closest bases nM±1, the opposite choice is adopted, alternating
ones and zeros.
The idea [1] is to set the light’s noise such that it overlaps
several physical bases. The choice of the number of bases M is
based on a POVM –Positive Operator Valued Measure– which
defines the probability of error given to the attacker (See Section
V of [1]) and it will be directly connected to the average number
of photons 〈n〉. Once M is defined, physical signals are gener-
ated creating a modulation (say, a phase φ) upon the laser beam.
This physical modulation is being called an encryption basis for
a fresh bit. To create each basis, m bits are necessary, 2m =M
or m= log2M :
phase basis number(for φb = 0
pi
M
,1
pi
M
, · · ·(M − 1) pi
M
)
≡ b(m)2m−1 + b(m− 1)2m−2 + · · ·b(1)20 . (5)
All bits of a generated by the PhRBG are represented by phase
values φa (either φ1 or φ0) and added to the corresponding
phase φb associated with the basis being used: φa+φb and sent
from A to B.
With nm bits, nmodulation bases b are created. They modu-
late the n fresh bits of a0: a0⊕b. As this sequence b is known to
A and B, B could used it to demodulate the received sequence,
extracting a0 = b⊕ (a0⊕ b).
As a brief comment, in the BB84 protocol, two bases are de-
fined to send one bit that is carried by a single photon. The
adversary must not know in which of the two bases the bit was
encoded. In a parallel way, for the key distribution protocol
discussed in this paper, the optical noise must protect against
attempts by the adversary to know which basis was used.
Now, A and B share the sequence a0. Eve may have obtained
some statistical information t on these bits and A and B task
is to eliminate t by PA – therefore, calculation of t is essential.
This is shown ahead.
Another level of difficulty, computational, will be added –
usually, this level of difficulty is used as a stand-alone protec-
tion level and may be sufficient by most of the cases even with
noiseless signals. This mathematical level of protection will be
discussed ahead as well as the effect of combining these two
protection levels.
Physically leaked bits – Assume that Alice sends n (n =
Length[n0]) uniform random bits to B. Eve has complete access
to the transmission channel, close to the sender, where the sig-
nal is maximum, and disposes of the ideal equipment, subjected
to the laws of Physics, to measure and record all emitted sig-
nals. No one monitors Eve’s intrusion and will not constrain
her endeavor in anyway. However, Alice will not send bits in
a repeated way; every bit information is sent only once. This
way, Eve obtains noisy signals representing the sent bits and
will treat them individually or collectively, as she pleases.
As shown by the POVM calculation in Section V of [1], there
is a minimum probability of error Pe for Eve when measuring
any bit due to the inherent noise in the optical channel and the
M -ry bases used. Pe is a function of the average photon number
〈n〉 in the signal representing a bit and M , the number of bases
used in the M -ry communication protocol. The POVM cal-
culation utilizes the wavefunction or density matrix represent-
ing all information about the transmitted bit. This is the maxi-
mum amount of information available about a physical system.
The result of the calculation indicates the best Eve could obtain,
even with an ideal measuring system and analyzing capabilities.
For numerical examples of these results, see Fig. 3 in [1]. The
probability of having a correct bit assignment by Eve is Pr =
1−Pe. Therefore, Eve is able to statistically assign correctly or
“extract” t≡ tbit = Pr − 0.5 = 0.5−Pe of each bit.
Therefore, tbit is a extraction rate of Eve (or, leak per bit).
Fig. 6 exemplifies the behavior of log10 tbit as a function of
M . As will be shown in Section VII, Eves probability to obtain
Fig. 6
LOGARITHM OF THE LOSS PER BIT TO EVE, tBIT , AS GIVEN BY THE
POVM CALCULATION THAT PROVIDES Pe . HERE 〈n〉= 1000.
all bits in a sequence is completely negligible.
6V. SIGNAL MODULATION AND DEMODULATION
The left side of Fig. 2 shows a modulation system (at Alice’s
station) that injects signals in the “noisy” channel of the opti-
cal fiber. At the right side of the same Fig. (at Bob’s station)
a demodulation system extracts the signals sent by Alice, eras-
ing the signals representing the encoding bases that produce the
indistinguishability of the signals to the attacker.
The modulation and demodulations systems are discussed in
[10] and will not be discussed here. The final signal ∆i = ie−
if representing the bits as extracted by Bob, come from the two
pin detectors in the demodulation system and are proportional
to the streams of photons
〈ne〉=−1
4
|α|2
[√
3sinϕcos2
(
∆
2
)
+
√
3cosϕsin∆−2
]
(6)
〈nf 〉= 1
4
|α|2
[√
3sinϕcos2
(
∆
2
)
+
√
3cosϕsin∆+2
]
, (7)
where ∆ is the path phase difference between the two arms of a
fiber Michelson interferometer in the bit extractor (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 7 shows plots for the direct currents ie and if for a given
laser intensity (arbitrarily taken at |α| = 10, and G = 1, ηd = 1
and a unitary time interval. ∆, set by the piezoelectric driver,
is set at ∆ = pi/2); G is the detector’s electronic gain and ηd is
the detector’s efficiency in the photon-to-electron conversion. It
if 
ie 
if -ie 
 
j=0 
j=p 
Fig. 7
PHOTON CURRENTS ie AND if OBTAINED FROM THE PIN DIODES AND THE
FINAL DIFFERENCE CURRENT ∆i= if − ie AS A FUNCTION OF THE INPUT
PHASE φ. PARTICULAR VALUES ARE INDICATED WITH φ= 0 AND φ= pi
THAT REPRESENT BITS 0 AND 1.
is seen that the best resolution for bits 0 and 1 is obtained from
the difference of the two currents, or ∆i= if − ie and not from
either current outputs ie or if alone.
As was shown, physical noise can create a physical barrier
to the attacker making it impossible for him/her to extract clean
bit signals from the channel. The attacker degree of success
is almost negligible and, furthermore, this small probability of
success is statistical in character.
At the same time the legitimate users extract clean signals and
obtain the bits sent from the current at the demodulator, as given
by Fig. 7.
These different results for the attacker and for the legitimate
user can be understood by the overlap between two states, as
given by Eq. (2). For the legitimate user he has only to distin-
guish between a bit 0 and a bit 1 encoded by a known basis value
b, within M possible values. For him, ∆φ= pi and, therefore
〈Ψ(φ)|Ψ(φ+pi)〉= e−2|α|2 → 0 . (8)
This result shows a comparison between two almost orthogo-
nal states, of easy identification, with negligible overlap. On
the contrary, not knowing the basis value the adversary has a
complex measurement problem that limits his/her knowledge
according to what was shown by the POVM calculation in [1].
VI. INCREASING THE PROTECTION LEVEL
The security of the proposed key distribution system does not
stop at this physical barrier but has its security further strength-
ened by Privacy Amplification (PA). The final security then
rests on a combination of physical and mathematical protec-
tions. Each of these aspects can be calculated as well as the
final probability for the attacker to obtain the final bit sequences
being shared by A and B. This provides a rigorous proof of the
security of the system. The adopted PA protocol will be dis-
cussed in the next sections.
Besides the security features for signal protection, the system
also uses a Message Authentication Code (MAC) to guarantee
that a message sent to Bob by Alice was really sent by Alice
and not by someone else.
An OMAC procedure, a MAC that uses just one key K and
with high security is adopted [11]. The information to be au-
thenticated is divided in M(j) blocks and the key K is applied
to the first block. The output, together with the key K, is ap-
plied to the second block and so on. At the end of the operations
a tag “T” is produced. The final output, with the tag, is send to
the receiver. He applies the same procedure and generates a tag.
If the generated tag coincides with T , the information is authen-
tic. There is no need to decrypt the message to perform the tag
check.
VII. PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION PROTOCOL
Before discussing the PA protocol, is should be emphasized
that although the physical protocol uses a somewhat larger num-
ber of bits (log2M ) to encode one bit, the process is continu-
ously sustained in rounds of s bits, in an unlimited way. This
process has been shown very fast in hardware.
The Privacy Amplification protocol adopted uses a bit pool of
constantly renewed random bits. For details, see [6]. Fig. 2 can
be used as a reference for description of the PA protocol. Before
discussing the level of security, a summary of the PA protocol
steps is given in Table I. After this summary, conditions for its
applicability will be discussed.
The first round of the protocol will be described in words:
INITIALIZATION: Alice and Bob share a starting sequence c0
of secret random bits. The sequence has size c0 =ms, wherem
is the number of bits necessary to describe one of the M basis
and s is the size of the first fresh sequence of random bits to be
shared between A and B.
Alice first steps –
A1a: Alice gets a random bitstring of length s in the bit pool
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TABLE I
PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION PROTOCOL FOR THE KEYBITS PLATFORM
PA protocol
INITIALIZATION: A and B share c0 of size and entropy ms.
ALICE
# ACTION COMMENT
1a ai = GetString(PhRBG) get bitstring from PhRBG
1b bi = ci−1[1,ms] extract ms from pool for bases b
1c Code&Send(ai, bi) send over αη channel
2 SendCC(f) send instance of universal hash f
over classical channel
3a ci = f(ci−1||ai) Alice applies PA from ms+ s bits
to ms+ s− t−λ
3b ci = f(ci−1||ai) Alice uses s= s− t−λ
bits from pool as the key stream z.
The remaining ms bits form
the bases’ bits for next round.
BOB
1a no matching step to Alice’s
1b bi = ci−1[1,ms] get bases bits from initial pool value
1c ai =Receive&Decode(bi) receive bits from αη channel
2 ReceiveCC(f) receive instance of universal hash f
3a ci = f(ci−1||ai) Bob applies PA from ms+ s bits
to ms+ s− t−λ
3b zi = Bob uses s= s− t−λ
ci[ms+1,ms+ s−t−λ] bits from pool as the key stream z.
The remaining ms bits form
the bases’ bits for next round.
fed from the PhRBG.
A1b: Alice gets the shared starting sequence c0 and partition
it in s parts with m bits each. Each subsequence of length m
randomly specifies one basis among the M bases.
A1c: Alice encodes each bit in s with the corresponding basis
and sends the signal to Bob over the noisy channel. See Section
IV for a description of the physical modulation to be used. Be-
forehand, Alice and Bob had agreed on the PA’s security param-
eter λ and calculated the statistical fraction t of a bit (t ≡ tbit)
leaked to Eve, see Fig. 6 and Eqs. (7) to (12) in Ref.[1].
A2: Alice sends an instance of a universal hash function f(∈ F)
to Bob over a noiseless channel with public acess.
A3a: Using f Alice applies PA and reduce the total number of
bits s+ms to s = s+ms− t− λ. The eavesdropper has no
knowledge on s or on the modified ms sequence. See [6] for
details.
A3b: The reduced sequence s is the distilled fresh random se-
quence z to be used for OTP encryption. The remaining fresh
random sequence ms will form the bases for the next run.
Bob first steps –
B1a: There is no corresponding step to Alice’s 1a.
B1b: Bob gets the shared starting sequence c0 and partitions it
in s parts with m bits each. Each subsequence of length m ran-
domly specifies one basis among the M bases. Bob and Alice
are then using the same set of bases.
B1c: Bob receives the physical signals sent by Alice, demodu-
lates them (See Fig. 2) and obtain the random bit stream coded
with the sm bases. As Bob knows the bases coding, he decodes
the random stream and obtains the stream s sent by Alice.
B2: Bob receives f over the classical channel.
B3a: Using f Bob applies PA and reduce the total number of
bits s+ms to s= s+ms− t−λ.
B3b: The reduced sequence s is the distilled fresh random se-
quence z to be used for OTP encryption. The remaining fresh
random sequence m× s will form the bases for the next run.
Therefore, both Bob and Alice share a secure sequence of ran-
dom bits s to be used as OTP.
This means that the generated stream from the PhRBG at Al-
ice’s station was transferred to Bob and a distilled secure se-
quence of random bits and base bits is obtained.
The protocols proceeds to next similar runs. After n runs, Alice
and Bob share ns bits.
Preliminary conditions for the PA protocol – The protocol
for Privacy Amplification [14] (or PA) offers a powerful tool to
decrease the amount of information an adversary (E) might have
acquired on a bit string transmitted from one legitimate user (A)
to a second one (B).
In this paper, A sends n random bits to B, from which E is
able to statistically gain tbit of information per pulse sent. The
amount of gained information by the adversary over a string of
n randomly distributed bits is tnbit.
Among quantities or conditions that the PA protocol need to
be applicable are the statistical gain tbit as well as a bound on
the second-order conditional Re´nyi entropy, R2(n|V = v), as
seen by the adversary E. Here V designate the variable under
control of E that has some degree of correlation to n.
Some preliminary steps may help to calculate R2(n|V = v).
The “collision probability” for a variableX specified by a prob-
ability distributionPX(x) can be defined (see [14] for details) as
Pc(X) =
∑
xχ
PX(x)
2 , (9)
from which the Re´nyi entropy of X can be calculated:
R(X) =− log2Pc(X) . (10)
The entropy in binary digits is also given in “bit” units, and
may be fractionary, differently from the physical bits 0 or 1
(encoded physical signals). Given an event E on X , with con-
ditional probability PX|E , one may directly write the collision
probability Pc(X|E) and the conditional Re´nyi entropy
R(X|E) =− log2P 2X|E . (11)
The variable X of interest should represent the bit stream trans-
mitted from A to B and the event E represents Eves access to
that stream.
The mapping of PX|E in terms of the physical processes gives
PX|E → Pr = 1−Pe , (12)
and
R(X|E) =− log2P 2X|E =− log2 (1−Pe)2 (13)
Fig. 8 shows an example of the collision Re´nyi entropy given by
Eq. (13) for the case of bits being transmitted with an average
8number of photons 〈n〉= 1000 per bit as a function of the num-
ber M of bases used. The asymptotic limit for Re´nyi entropy
is
R(X|E) =− log2 (1−Pe)2→ 2 /per bit , (14)
for Pe → 1/2. This result can be interpreted as follows: For
large M , Eve succeeds in obtain one collision, or statistical-
success, in every two trials. Due to the uniformity of the random
Fig. 8
EXAMPLE OF THE CONDITIONAL RE´NYI COLLISION ENTROPY OF ORDER
TWO FOR BITS BEING TRANSMITTED WITH 〈n〉= 100/BIT SIGNAL AS A
FUNCTION OF THE NUMBER OF BASES M .
sequences, for a stream of n bits the Re´nyi entropy will give the
corresponding limit R(n|E)→ 2×n≡ c.
The PA protocol using a compression function G within
a universal class of hash functions maps the received stream
{1,0}n onto {1,0}r. Assuming that A and B uses z ≡ {1,0}r
as their secret stream of bits, it is known that [14]
H (z|G,V = v)≥ r− 2
r−c
loge 2
. (15)
Therefore, as r < n and c = 2n, then r < c. Eve’s entropy on
the keys is
H (z)−H (z|G,V = v)' 2
r−2n
loge 2
, (16)
and goes exponentially to zero as n increases. In conclusion,
the string of r random bits can be protected by the PA protocol.
Fig. 9 exemplifies Eq. (16) for a range of n and r values.
A. Overall security
Having demonstrated the possibility for application of the PA
protocol [14] for this key distribution scheme, one may invoke
corollary 5 of the PA theorem. In words, the expected infor-
mation of Eve about the secret key (assume length rt) is given
by the mutual information I on the secret key given the infor-
mation t acquired by Eve when Alice and Bob use a randomly
chosen function from a universal class of hash functions:
I ≤ 1
ln2× 2λ , (17)
Fig. 9
AN EXAMPLE THAT SHOWS THAT EVE’S AMOUNT OF INFORMATION ON
THE HASHED KEY STREAM IS NEGLIGIBLE (SEE EQ. (16)).
where λ is a security parameter λ < rt− t. This way, by elim-
inating t bits of rt, Eve’s information decreases exponentially
while Alice and Bob knows s− 1/(ln2× 2λ) bits.
In a sequence of s bits sent, two factors will work against Eve.
The first one is the effect of the noisy channel on her measure-
ments and the second one is the result of applying the Privacy
Amplification protocol.
Using the probability of an error by Eve, Pe, as shown in
Section V of Reference [1], to correctly guess a particular bit
sent through the noisy channel, the “hit” probability t1 is t1 =
1−Pe. This says that Eve’s probability of obtaining all s bits
is ts = (1−Pe)s, because the keys are uncorrelated as well as
the physical signals that carry them. This probability gives Eve
a negligible chance of success.
The legitimate users may adopt the strategy of defining the
key sequence length s such that after sending all of them, sta-
tistically the adversary could have gained less than one bit, that
is to say s(1− Pe) < 1. In other words, the legitimate users
choose s < 1/(1−Pe). This says that the amount of t+λ bits
to be reduced from s+ms (see Step 3a in Table I) would be
t+λ' λ.
The physical noise in the channel basically reduces enor-
mously the amount of information that Eve could obtain from
the channel. On the other way, if A and B use long sequences
such that s(1− Pe)  1, a larger number of bits have to be
added to λ to make effective the PA protocol. Therefore, from
now on Eq. (A) will be adopted as a condition to establish the
lengths of the key sequence runs.
After A and B have applied the PA protocol, together with the
effects of the noisy channel, the number of bits is reduced from
s to r distilled bits. The information obtained by Eve is given
by
Ir ' 1
ln2× 2λ . (18)
Fig. 10 gives an example of Eq. (18).
VIII. ADVERSARY WITH INFORMATION ON THE BIT POOL?
It may be argued that even if the adversary tries to obtain
the basis that has encoded a bit and fails, some exclusive infor-
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Fig. 10
EVES INFORMATION ON r BITS AFTER ALICE AND BOB APPLIES THE PA
PROTOCOL ON THE BIT STREAM OBTAINED FROM THE NOISY αη CHANNEL
UNDER THE CONDITION s(1−Pe)< 1.
mation on the bases’ wheel is gained. This information may be
seen as a set of bases to be excluded from the bit pool and, there-
fore, will simplify a posterior analysis. Therefore, the question
“Will this gained information increases Eve’s knowledge on the
bit pool for posterior analysis on a reduced set of unknowns?”
This question may be answered with the Mutual Information
between B (or A) and E, I(B;E). More specifically, assum-
ing that A nd B utilized (secretly) a given basis φb to encode a
bit b, 0 or pi, what will be the Mutual Information I(φb;φE),
where φE is Eve’s estimated value obtained from an arbitrary
measurement?
First of all, the Mutual Information will be calculated to re-
veal the amount of information the adversary could obtain from
a bit only considering the optical noise effect on the mesoscopic
signal. This absolute measure could be compared with Mini-
mum Probability of Error by Eve PEe already calculated in [1].
As discussed, any small amount of information leaked by the
channel can be privacy amplified.
A. Mutual Information
In order to write the Mutual Information
I(X;Y ) =H(X)−H(X|Y ) (19)
on the desired variables, one may start with the relationships
H(X|Y ) =
∑
x,y
p(x|y) log2
1
p(x|y) (20)
H(X) =
∑
x
p(x) log2
1
p(x)
→
M−1∑
k=0
(
1
M
)
log2
1(
1
M
)
= log2M . (21)
Therefore,
I(X;Y ) = log2M −
∑
k,kE
p(k|kE) log2
1
p(k|kE) . (22)
Eq. (2) gives the un-normalized Conditional Probability
p(k|kE) = e−|α|2[1−cos[(pi/M)(k−kE)])] . (23)
The notation designates an angle set by the legitimate users as
φ= kpi/M and an angle set by the adversary as φE = kEpi/M .
The normalized form of the Conditional Probability will be
written
pnorm(k|kE)= e
−|α|2[1−cos[(pi/M)(k−kE)])]∑M−1
k=0
∑M−1
kE=0
e−|α|2[1−cos[(pi/M)(k−kE)])]
.(24)
The Mutual Information can be written, in normalized form,
for specific values of the phases φ and φE , using pnorm(k|kE).
One obtains
I(X = φ;Y = φE) =
1
M
log2M −
e−|α|
2[1−cos[(pi/M)(k−kE)])]∑M−1
k=0
∑M−1
kE=0
e−|α|2[1−cos[(pi/M)(k−kE)])]
× log2
[
e|α|
2[1−cos[(pi/M)(k−kE)])]
×
M−1∑
k=0
M−1∑
kE=0
e−|α|
2[1−cos[(pi/M)(k−kE)])]
]
. (25)
One may interpret I(X = φ;Y = φE) as the average reduction
in uncertainty about φ when Eve in some way learns φE . As the
k values are uniformly distributed the entropy of φ (or k) is
H(k) =
1
M
log2
1
1
M
=
1
M
log2M , (26)
The relative reduction in uncertainty obtained by Eve can be
quantified by
rI/H ≡ I(k;kE)
H(k)
(
0≤ rI/H ≤ 1
)
. (27)
Fig. 11 shows I(k = 20;kE)/H(k = 20) for |α|2 = 〈n〉 = 100
and two set of bases, M = 100 and M = 200. The value 20 is
arbitrary, as any other value gives similar results.
Going back to the question “Will this gained information in-
creases Eve’s knowledge on the basis or bit sent?”, one con-
cludes that she gains some information around the basis value
k used by the legitimate users but no knowledge for distant val-
ues from k. Therefore, the small amount of information gained
by Eve just by excluding bases numbers distant from the ba-
sis value set, will be irrelevant after PA methods reduce this
leaked information to a negligible level. Therefore, the amount
of Eve’s useful information about the bit pool is negligible.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The key distribution system introduced in [1] was revisited
and improved with inclusion of a specific protocol for the key
distribution that includes both the noise protected step and a PA
protocol. The PA protocol uses the bit pool shown in Fig. 2.
It was shown that starting with a shared sequence of n0 m
random bits to form physical bases, A and B can distribute in a
secure way an unlimited number of secure bits generated by a
PhRBG generator. The overall security of the key distribution
depends on signal to noise ratio in the transmitted signals, the
number of bases M used and the shuffling produced by the PA
protocol.
10
𝑛𝑛 =100
𝑀𝑀 = 100 𝑀𝑀 = 200
Fig. 11
EXAMPLE OF THE RELATIVE INFORMATION I(k;kE)/H(k) GAINED BY
EVE ON H(k) WHEN SHE LEARNS kE FROM HER MEASUREMENT. WHEN
I(k = 20;kE)/H(k = 20)→ 1 SHE GAINS NO INFORMATION ON x, WHAT
OCCURS FOR MOST OF THE BASES VALUES. ONLY WHEN kE IS SET CLOSE
TO k SHE ACQUIRES SOME INFORMATION. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE
PHYSICAL NOISE THAT PRODUCES THE PHYSICAL UNCERTAINTY ON kE
(OR φE ), even WITH kE = k HER KNOWLEDGE DOES NOT GIVE HER THE
DESIRED I(k = 20;kE)/H(k = 20)→ 0 BUT ONLY A LIMITED GAIN. HER
OVERALL PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS IS GIVEN BY (1−Pe).
The key distribution process is as a “one-time-pad booster”
which allow users to use bit-by-bit encryption for top security
level applications and, at the same time, allows fast encryp-
tion of large volumes of information. When working in fiber-
optic channels, the system demands, besides the use of a true
physical random bit generator working at high speeds, analog-
to-digital, digital-to-analog converters, optical modulators and
separate channels to avoid perturbation from ordinary signal
channels. In optical channels with signals of mesoscopic in-
tensities, the system presents two layers of protection, physical
noise and computational difficulties, such as the one exempli-
fied by PA with universal hash functions. The system can also
be used with classical signals in generic channels using only the
computational difficulty guaranteed by the PA protocol when
the protection given by the optical noise is not present (noiseless
channels). When used in optical channels both security levels
are present.
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APPENDICES
A. PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION - TOEPLITZ MATRICES
Privacy Amplification can be used to increase the security
level already given by the physical noise in the channel. The
PA procedure establishes [14] that once A have sent to B a se-
quence a of bits (n = Length[n0]), if Eve obtains an estimated
number of st bits, A and B could reduce the amount of Eve’s
information.
To achieve this end, A and B need to agree on a procedure
that results in a shorter secure string a′ on which Eve has an
exponentially vanishing knowledge. This procedure demands
that the number initial bits n has to be reduced by st and even
further by a security parameter λ (in bits) to guarantee that Eve
can obtain at most 1/ ln(2)2λ bits (see Section IV of [14]) on
a′. These operations can be performed on the bit pool shown in
Fig. 2. The procedure to reduce a to a′ may use a hash function
H: Ha= a′, whereH is a matrix with random elements.
Among the several possible PA choices and for H - of ran-
dom elements, one could choose a matrix where all elements are
randomly and independently chosen or even constructed with a
starting set of randomly chosen elements. This matrix can be
renewed at each distribution bit round for maximum security.
Just to explain the PA process with renewed matrix elements
for increased security, an example using a Toeplitz matrix will
be presented. A Toeplitz matrix has a simple structure of form
H=

r1 c2 c3 c4 ...
r2 r1 c2 c3 ...
r3 r2 r1 c2 ...
... ... ... ... ...
 , (28)
where ri and cj are binary random digits taken from the
PhRBG. The number of columns should be equal to the num-
ber of fresh bits n to be transmitted plus the number of bits
nm (secretely shared by A and B) to generate the modulation
bases for the transmitted bits. The number of rows is equal the
n+ n×m− ntleak − λ. The number of bits in a column is the
same number of bits in a. This way, an input bit stream, or
a vector with n(m+ 1) components (bits) gives an output of
n(m+ 1)−ntleak−λ bits, which is the desired reduction in the
number of bits for A and B such that Eve has a negligible knowl-
edge on them.
What is the number of secure bits finally available for OTP?
– What was just described was a PA protocol applied for a first
run starting with n0(m+ 1) bits. The output number of bits n0
was reduced to n1(m+ 1)−n1tleak−λ bits.
As shown in the PA protocol (Section VII), after the first
round both Alice and Bob share a distilled sequence of s secure
bits to be used as OTP and still have a shared fresh sequence of
bases bits sm.
The process is unlimited in number of runs and will be as
fast as the current technology allows because there are no fun-
damental physical limitations in the bit generation occurring in
the PhRBG.
B. STOKES PARAMETERS OF A NOISY FIELD
The phase modulation specified by Eq. (1)
|Ψ(φ)〉= e−iJzφ|Ψ0〉= | α√
2
e−iφ/2〉x| α√
2
eiφ/2〉y , (29)
is imposed as a phase difference between two orthogonal po-
larization components represented by annihilation operators a
and b, representing fields of equal intensity. This form is due to
the optical modulator being considered. As the imposed elec-
tric field (assumed of weak intensity to avoid non-linear effects)
travels along the optical fiber, it undergoes randomized polariza-
tion fluctuations in direction caused by several somewhat local-
ized effects that modifies the dielectric constants of the support-
ing glass medium. These effects include thermal fluctuations,
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acoustic modes, Mie scattering, mechanical stresses,.... The de-
modulation system represented at the right in Fig. 2 subtracts
the base modulation effects regardless these random contribu-
tions, by operating on two arbitrary polarization components.
One may question if the adversary, Eve, would be able to per-
form phase measurements close to the emitter, such that these
complicating perturbations have not taken an appreciable effect
yet. Her goal is to extract precise phase information such that
she could resolve the angular separation ∆φ1 between two clos-
est bases k and k+ 1. In general, writing ∆φ in terms of base
indexes k, k′, one has ∆φ = (pi/M)(k− k′). The question is
“what is the effect on the inherent optical shot-noise on her mea-
surements?”. An equivalent but more precise question would
be “what is the maximum resolution on k − k′ possible to be
achievable by Eve given an average number of photons 〈n〉 and
a number of bases M?”
In order to answer this question, one may start recalling
some adequate tools such as Stokes parameters and the Poincare´
sphere. In order to understand transformations of an optical
medium or a device on any incoming light mode, it is useful
to depict the Poincare´ sphere of polarizations (See Fig. 12) and
to write the incoming polarized electric field in terms of the
variables for this sphere. A polarization state is represented by
S
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Fig. 12
Θ AND Φ ARE THE POLAR AND AZIMUTHAL ANGLES THAT INDICATE A
POINT P ON THE SPHERE. POLARIZATIONS ON THE EQUATOR OF THIS
SPHERE REPRESENT LINEARLY POLARIZED STATES WITH DIFFERENT
INCLINATION ANGLES. FOR EXAMPLE, A POINT ON Φ = 0,Θ = pi/2
REPRESENT A LINEARLY POLARIZED STATE ALONG x, FOR LIGHT
PROPAGATING ALONG z, WHILE ITS ANTIPODAL POINT Φ = pi,Θ = pi/2
REPRESENTS A LINEARLY POLARIZED STATE ALONG y. SIMILARLY, A
POINT Θ = 0 REPRESENTS A (+) CIRCULARLY POLARIZED LIGHT STATE
AND POINT Θ = pi A (-) CIRCULARLY POLARIZED LIGHT STATE.
ARBITRARY POINTS, LIKE P, REPRESENT ELLIPTICAL POLARIZATION
STATES.
a point on the Poincare´ sphere given by the two coordinates Θ
(polar angle) and Φ (azimuthal angle). The Poincare´ sphere has
its radius defined by the Stokes’ parameter s0 (equal to the in-
tensity of the polarized light) and the projections of the point
(Θ,Φ) on the orthogonal axes S1, S2 and S3. These projections
have values s1, s2 and s3 and are known as Stokes’ parameters
(Stokes, 1852) [16]. Therefore, the Stokes parameters describe
a general polarized light state.
Physical analyzers such as the crystal axis of a polarization
beam splitter or wave-plates produce field projections onto the
Poincare´’s sphere axes and allow for photon number or intensity
measurements, leading to s0,s1,s2,s3.
Operations and operators describing these measurements are
known either in the classical or quantum domain. In the quan-
tum domain these parameters are given by the expectation val-
ues of the Hermitian operators of the number operator N̂ and of
the total angular momentum of light as described by Schwinger
in terms of two bosonic modes given by annihilation operators
â and b̂
ŝ0 = â
†â+ b̂†b̂ = N̂ (30)
ŝ1 = â
†â− b̂†b̂ = 2Ĵz = σ̂z (31)
ŝ2 = â
†b̂+ b̂†â = 2Ĵx = σ̂x (32)
ŝ3 =
1
i
(â†b̂− b̂†â) = 2Ĵy = σ̂y , (33)
from which 〈ŝ0〉= s0, 〈ŝ1〉= s1, 〈ŝ2〉= s2, 〈ŝ3〉= s3.
At this point it is interesting to note that Eqs. (30) to (33)
define operators Ji, (i = x,y, z) in terms of boson operators a
and b (hats will be ignored from now on) and that they obey
the same commutation properties as the ones connected with
angular momentum: [Ji,Jk] = iijkJk. This leads to the con-
servation of the total number of photons n as they go through a
lossless optical device: n= na +nb = a†a+ b†b.
Standard procedures to perform these measurements have
been well established [16] and, from the experimental side, even
automated measuring systems can be found to perform these
tasks. For example, designating an intensity by I and by x the
horizontal axis H and by y the vertical axis V , and by the in-
dexes R and L, circular states of light, one could write
s0 = IH + IV = a
2 + b2 (34)
s1 = IH − IV = a2− b2 = s0 cos(2β)cos(2θ) (35)
s2 = I450 − I−450 = 2abcosφ= s0 cos(2β)sin(2θ) (36)
s3 = IR− IL = 2absinφ= s0 sin(2β) . (37)
See Fig. 13 for definitions. Light noise associated to a source
x
y
ξ
η
β
θ
a b
a1
b1
E
0
Fig. 13
A POLARIZATION STATE OF LIGHT REPRESENTED BY AN ELLIPSE, WITH
PRINCIPAL AXES ALONG ξ AND η, DEPICTED WITH THE MAIN AXES x AND
y. β CAN BE EITHER POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, GIVING THE SENSES IN
WHICH THE ELLIPSE MAY BE DESCRIBED (SEE FIG. 12, TOP OR BOTTOM
HALF HEMISPHERE).
of light cannot be eliminated and noise-to-signal ratio cannot
be be rendered arbitrarily negligible. The influence of the noise
on the propagated signals can be explored in several ways, in-
cluding for cryptographic purposes. The associated error in
these measurements are by far less established and belong to
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the quantum research realm ([17], [18]). Generalized quantum
measurements have been applied to separate deterministically
two nonorthogonal quantum states and add a necessary set of
inconclusive results [19]. The subject is a permanent area of
research [20].
To see the effect of noise, one may calculate 〈Ĵz〉, 〈Ĵx〉,
〈Ĵy〉 and the associated variances σ2z = 〈
(
Ĵz −〈Ĵz〉
)2
〉, σ2x =
〈
(
Ĵx−〈Ĵx〉
)2
〉, σ2y = 〈
(
Ĵy −〈Ĵy〉
)2
〉 .
Observing that 〈(Ji−〈Ji〉) (Jk −〈Jk〉)〉 = 〈JiJk〉 −
〈Ji〉〈Jk〉, the quantities 〈JiJk〉 and 〈Ji〉 have to be calculated
for the x, y, z components. Expansion of the JiJk products
in normal order and application of the operators on the
wave-function given by Eq. (1) is straightforward. One obtains
〈ψ|JxJx|ψ〉 = 〈n〉
8
[2 + 〈n〉(1 + cos(2φ))] (38)
〈ψ|JxJy|ψ〉 = 〈n〉
8
sin(2φ) (39)
〈ψ|JxJz|ψ〉 = −i 〈n〉
4
sinφ (40)
〈ψ|JyJx|ψ〉 = 〈n〉
8
sin(2φ) (41)
〈ψ|JyJy|ψ〉 = 〈n〉
8
[2 + 〈n〉(1− cos(2φ))] (42)
〈ψ|JyJz|ψ〉 = i 〈n〉
4
cosφ (43)
〈ψ|JzJx|ψ〉 = i 〈n〉
4
sinφ (44)
〈ψ|JzJy|ψ〉 = −i 〈n〉
4
cosφ (45)
〈ψ|JzJz|ψ〉 = 〈n〉 , (46)
〈ψ|Jx|ψ〉= 〈n〉
2
cosφ,〈ψ|Jy|ψ〉= 〈n〉
2
sinφ,〈ψ|Jz|ψ〉=0.(47)
The ratio 〈ψ|Jy|ψ〉/〈ψ|Jx|ψ〉 of expected values of the Hermi-
tian operators would give a measure of tanφ and, therefore, of
φ – if not for the deviations produced by the light noise. Con-
sidering these deviations one has
tan(φ±∆φ) = 〈ψ|Jy|ψ〉±σy〈ψ|Jx|ψ〉±σx =
sin
[
pi
M k
]± 1√〈n〉
cos
[
pi
M k
]± 1√〈n〉 , (48)
where φ was written in the discrete set of M k phase values. In
order to get the extrema of tan(φ±∆φ) one writes:
tanφMax =
sin
[
pi
M k
]
+ 1√〈n〉
cos
[
pi
M k
]− 1√〈n〉 , tanφmin =
sin
[
pi
M k
]− 1√〈n〉
cos
[
pi
M k
]
+ 1√〈n〉
Fig. 14 shows Eqs. 49 and 49 in a range of values. ∆k repre-
sents the irreducible uncertainty due to the phase noise. In this
example ∆k 1. Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 show the ∆k for a differ-
ent set of values 〈n〉 and M . Fig. 15 shows that for a fixed 〈n〉
the uncertainty ∆k (or ∆φ) increases with the number of bases
M used. Fig. 16 shows that for an intense field 〈n〉  1 the
uncertainty ∆k can be reduced giving the resolution ∆k  1
tan(߶)୑ୟ୶
tan(߶)୫୧୬
∆k
݊ =700
M=1000
Fig. 14
A SAMPLE OF EXTREMA FOR tan
(
k
M
±∆k
)
VERSUS k.
‚nÚ=700
M=1000
∆kà1
‚nÚ=700
M=3000
∆kà1
tan(߶)୑ୟ୶
tan(߶)୑ୟ୶
tan(߶)୫୧୬
tan(߶)୫୧୬
Fig. 15
EXTREMA FOR tan
(
k
M
±∆k
)
VERSUS k.
or ∆φ < pi/M . In this condition of intense fields, the adver-
sary could identify any basis used and, therefore, obtain the bit
sent from A to B. This shows that A and B can frustrate the
adversary by choosing 〈n〉 and M such that the adversary can-
not distinguish which basis was used in every emission. The
POVM calculation shown in [1] details this in a complementary
and quite general way.
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